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NOTES

PRICE CONTROLS THROUGH THE BACK
DOOR: THE PARALLEL IMPORTATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. FOREIGN PRICE CONTROLS TRIGGER DOMESTIC LEGISLATION

As busloads of senior-citizens travel to Canada and Mexico to take
advantage of cheaper prices on prescription drugs, U.S. lawmakers, eager to
please their senior-citizen constituents, feast over proposals that would make
pharmaceuticals cheaper here in the United States.' In the fall of 2000,
Congress overwhelmingly passed amendments to the Agricultural Appropriations Bill (H.R. 446 1),2 intended to alleviate the need for the elderly, as well
as all other consumers of prescription drugs, to travel abroad for lower
prices.' Were the 2000 amendments to take effect, 4 pharmacists and drug
wholesalers could buy Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved,
American-made drugs in foreign countries, where the drugs are cheaper, and
then "reimport" them into the United States. The drugs could then be sold
for less than current retail prices.' Although Congress passed the bill as a
"free market" solution to the high costs of prescription drugs, the primary

'A Drug War ofa Different Sort, CONG. DAILY, Apr. 7,2000,2000 WL 6431403.
2 Through the remainder of the Note, the two amendments to H.R. 4461 will be referred to as the

"2000 amendments."
' Susan Warner, Legislationin CongressAims toLower US. DrugPricesThroughReimportation,THE
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 18, 2000, 2000 WL 26754675. The 2000 amendments passed by votes of 370-12
and 363-12 in the House and 74-21 in the Senate. l
4 A late provision added to the amendments mandated that they would not take effect unless the
FDA certified that the drugs entering the U.S. were safe. According to the FDA, certification would
require an additional $90 million per year which could not be appropriated until fiscal year 2002 at the
earliest. John Carey, Medicines Without Borders: The Move is on to Reimport ForeignDrugs, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 9, 2000, at 130,2000 WL 24485608.
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reason prescription drugs are cheaper in foreign countries, particularly in
Canada and Mexico, is because of government enacted price controls, not
market forces.6
B. THE ISSUE: HOW SHOULD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS WORK TO
CONTROL THE GLOBAL FLOW OF GOODS

The above legislation goes to the very heart of an issue debated in
intellectual property, international and economic circles: How should
nationally granted intellectual property rights work in controlling the flow
of goods on a global scale?7 The plan of this Note is to address this question
with respect to pharmaceutical patents. First, this Note will put the issue in
context by explaining the applicable intellectual property (P) doctrines,
outlining the resolution, or lack thereof, prescribed by the international
community, and summarizing the laws of the United States and European
Union on this issue. Then, this Note will address the economics of the
pharmaceutical industry. Finally, this Note will analyze the wisdom of
allowing drug wholesalers to purchase pharmaceuticals abroad and reimport
them into the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
A. "EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS" AND THE "FIRST SALE DOCTRINE"

The most fundamental limitation on an intellectual property right,
whether it is a patent, trademark, or copyright, is exhaustion upon first sale.8
After a good or article containing an intellectual property right, or "IPR," is
sold, the IP owner can no longer control the fate of that good; his rights have
"exhausted." This is commonly known as the first sale doctrine.' Conse

6 Id

' See Vincent Chiappetta, The DesirabilityofAgreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International
Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 335 (2000) (stating that the TRIPS
negotiations completely broke down upon discussing this issue); see also Andreas Reindl, Intellectual
Propertyand Inta.Community Trade, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 819, 819 (1997) (stating that the role of
intellectual property rights in intra-Community trade has been the subject of passionate debate since the
early days of the European Community).
' Darren E. Donnelly, ParallelTrade and InternationalHarmonizationof the Exhaustion of Rights
Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 449 (1997).
SId. at 447. It isimportant to remember that the first sale doctrine only frees that specific good from
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quently, after the first sale of a product with an IPR, "a purchaser can resell
the product without being liable for infringement."'0
B. "PARALLEL IMPORTS": THE RESULT OF APPLYING THE FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE INTERNATIONALLY

How the first sale doctrine is applied internationally is becoming of
increasing importance as trade barriers crumble and goods move freely
among nations. 1 Due to differing purchasing powers among nations,
varying labor and other production costs, as well as different governmental
regulations, the same product is often priced differently in different
countries.' These price differentials create powerful incentives for third
party distributors to purchase products in low-priced countries and then
resell them in high-priced countries, discounting the price routinely charged
by the IPR holder in the high-priced countries.13 Consequently, international application of the first sale doctrine can frustrate JPR holders' attempts
to maximize the value of their property rights. 4
Goods that are purchased abroad by an independent third party and then
resold domestically to compete against authorized goods are known as
parallel imports." Parallel imports are genuine goods; they are not pirated
nor counterfeit.1 6 Nevertheless, an IPR holder may be able to prevent their
sale if the IPR issuing nation does not apply the first sale doctrine to goods
sold in foreign countries.

further claims by the IP holder. Seealso Chiappetta, supra note 7, at 341 n.32 (stating that the holder's IPR
can be used to prevent direct exploitation of the intellectual product such as production of additional
products or copies).
l0 Donnelly, supra note 8, at 447.
" David Perkins et al., Exhaustion ofIntellectualProperty Rights, in PLI'S FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at 41, 43 & 45 (PL Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Handbook Series No. 574, Oct. 1999).
1 il at 45.
'3

Id. at 46.

14

Id

"5Hillary A. Kremen, Note, Caveat Venditor: InternationalApplicationofthe FirstSaleDoctrine,23
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 161, 162 (1997).
" Perkins et al., supra note 11, at 47.
,' See Darren E. Donnelly, supranote 8, at 449 (explaining that whether an IPR holder has exhausted
her IPR depends on whether those rights are territorial or universal).
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C. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE UNDER A REGIME OF
INTERNATIONAL VS. NATIONAL EXHAUSTION

Because IPRs are granted and enforced at a national level, the IPR owner
must seek protection in each country individually."8 Therefore, the patent
owner acquires several parallel patents, one from each country in which she
registers.19 If a country follows a rule of national exhaustion, the authorized
distribution (first sale) of that good domestically will prevent the patent
holder's further domestic enforcement of her patent against those "possessing, using or redistributing the particular good."2" However, the patent
holder would still be able to use her domestic patent to prevent the import
or resale of authorized products sold abroad. Thus, under a national
exhaustion regime the patent holder can use-her parallel patent to prevent
products first sold in one nation from entering another.2
Under a regime of international exhaustion, on the other hand, the first
sale of a product anywhere in the world by the patent owner or with her
consent exhausts the holder's parallel patents in all other countries.22
Consequently, a patent owner is powerless to stop parallel imports under a
regime of international exhaustion.23
The following example will illustrate how parallel imports, national
versus international exhaustion and the first sale doctrine interrelate.24
Inventor "X" develops a new drug for the treatment of skin cancer. Due to
the national nature of patent laws, "X" must submit a patent application in
each country in which she desires to patent her drug. Say she wants to
obtain a patent in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
Assuming she is successful, she will have a separate but parallel patent in each
nation. The protection she receives under each patent will vary according
to the patent regime of that nation.
As a result of different market and regulatory conditions, the price of the
drug may vary considerably among the three nations. For example, the price

s Chiappetta, supra note 7, at 341-42.
SId While for the purposes of discussing national and international exhaustion this Note references
patent rights, the same concepts apply to copyrights and trademarks as well.

2'Id at 341.
21 Id

22
23

d
Id

"' See Chiappetta, supra note 7, at 341 (providing a similar illustration on the exhaustion of IPRs).
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in the United Kingdom may be substantially less than in Japan. Seizing the
opportunity, an independent trader purchases mass quantities of the drug in
the United Kingdom and then imports the drug into Japan for resale at less
than the price "X" charges for the drug in Japan.
What are the rights of the inventor? Under a national view of exhaustion, each individual patent carries an independent right. Therefore, the sale
of the drug in the United Kingdom would not exhaust "X's" right to prevent
the parallel importation of the drug into Japan. However, under an
international view of exhaustion, the parallel patents are interconnected.
The sale of the drug in the United Kingdom exhausts the rights under all
other parallel patents. Consequently, inventor "X" could not prohibit the
parallel importation of her drug into Japan.
Ial. THE LAW
A. EXHAUSTION UNDER THE "TRIPS" AGREEMENT

During the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1993, the international
community enacted the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS").25 Although the TRIPS agreement did make
important steps to harmonize substantive IPRs across the international
community, the agreement failed to reconcile the exhaustion issue.26
Proponents of international exhaustion argued that the free flow of parallel
imports would force market efficiencies and was in the spirit of free-trade
ideals embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
and the World Trade Organization ("WTO").27 National exhaustion
advocates argued that allowing for market divisions encourages research and
development of IP products and avoids intruding upon traditional national
sovereignty over intellectual property matters.28
Article six reflects the deadlock that resulted: "For the purposes of
dispute settlement under this Agreement ...
nothing in this Agreement shall

2 Theresa Beeby Lewis, PatentProtectionfor the Pharmaceuticallndustry:A Survey oftbe PatentLaws
of Various Countries,30 INT'L LAW., 835, 849 (Winter 1996).
"6 Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the PharmaceuticalIndustry:

ImplicationsforInnovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 185, 190 (1999).
' Chiappetta, supra note 7, at 346.
28

Id
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be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights." 29 As a result, national and regional governments, like the European
Union, have the exclusive authority to determine under what circumstances
IPRs exhaust.3"
B. UNITED STATES CASE LAW:

SOMEWHERE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND

INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION

Current U.S. patent law provides that "whoever without authority
makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States during
the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent."" While on its face
this statute would appear to provide a patent holder with the right to exclude
parallel imports,32 case law indicates the statute is limited to an extent by a
rule of international exhaustion. 3
The most recent Supreme Court case on the issue of parallel imports
involved copyright law. In Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L 'anzaResearch
International,the plaintiff, who had copyrighted the label used on its goods,
sold hair care products domestically and overseas.34 In the domestic market,
the plaintiff engaged in an extensive advertising and distribution scheme
allowing it to sell its products at prices 35% to 40% more than it sold them
in overseas markets.3 Capitalizing on the price differential, a third party
purchased the hair-care products overseas and imported them back into the
United States.' 6 Plaintiff sued the third party for copyright infringement.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that once an American made product had
been sold overseas with the consent of the copyright owner, the owner of
the copyright had no further control over that product's fate.3" Since this
" Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 6932,33 I.L.M 86 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
'0 Jj

"

35 U.S.C. S271(a) (1994).

' See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 198 (arguing that the statute provides full backing
for U.S. patent holders to bar parallel imports, obviating the need to rely on previous court decisions).
31See Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 135, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1961, 1961 (1998) (holding that the first sale doctrine is applicable to imported goods containing
a copyright).
34Id
3

Id. at 139.

3Id
31

Id. at 139-40.

" Id. at 152.
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decision, there has been considerable debate over whether and how this case
applies to patents.39
1. Application ofthe FirstSale DoctrineInternationallyin U.S. PatentCases.
The seminal patent case addressing whether the first sale doctrine applies
internationally is Boesch v. Griff, decided by the Supreme Court in 1890.40
There, the plaintiff owned parallel patents for lamp burners in the United
States and Germany.4' Plaintiff sued to keep lamps lawfully purchased in
Germany from being sold in the United States. Under German law at that
time, a third party could manufacture and sell patented products so long as
that party had done so prior to the patent owner's submission of the patent
application.4 2 Consequently, the plaintiff could not prevent a third party
from selling his patented lamp burners in Germany.3
Basing its decision on national sovereignty, the Court held that the
plaintiff could prevent a third party from importing the lamps lawfully sold
in Germany into the United States. 44
The right which [the third-party manufacturer] had to make
and sell the burners in Germany was allowed him under the
laws of that country, and purchasers from him could not be
thereby authorized to sell the articles in the United States in
defiance of the rights of patentees under a United States
patent. A prior foreign patent operates under our law to
limit the duration of the subsequent patent here, but that is
all. The sale of articles in the United States under a United
States patent cannot be controlled byforeign laws.45 (emphasis
added).
Thus, Boesch v. Grffestablished the rule that an unauthorized sale overseas
of a patented good does not exhaust U.S. patent rights.46

"' See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 199 (stating that the press has widely trumpeted the
ruling as a triumph for unrestricted parallel trade in general).
" Boesch v. Griff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
41

Id

42 Id at 698.
43

Id

4
45

Id at 703.
Id at 703.

46

Id
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How far the Boesch rule extends, however, is uncertain. 7 Five years prior
to Boesch, the District Court of New York in Holiday v. Mattheson held that
parallel importation of patented goods first sold overseas under the authority
of the patent owner did not infringe the United States patent.4 There, the
owner of the patent sold his patented goods in England.49 The defendant
acquired the goods in England and imported them back to the United
States."0 The defendant did not have the plaintiff's permission to import the
patented product. Nevertheless, the court refused to grant the plaintiff an
injunction."1 The court reasoned that there was a presumption upon the sale
of a good that the seller intends to part with all his rights in the thing sold. 2
It would be inconsistent with this presumption to allow the seller then to
restrict the buyer's use when no such restriction was made at the time of
sale. 3 Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff's patent rights at home
were exhausted after the goods were sold abroad. 4 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court in Boesch ignored the Mattheson decision in its opinion. 5
In Curtiss AeroplaneandMotor Corp. v. UnitedAircraft EngineeringCorp.,
the plaintiff held thirteen U.S. patents for various improvements on
airplanes.' The plaintiff authorized the British government to practice its
patents in Canada to build planes for military defense. A Canadian company
was formed to build the planes."s Included in the contract was a provision
stating that the patent could not be practiced for any other manufacture, use,
or sale, except by the British government. 8 However, the contract
contained no express restrictions on what the British government could do
with the planes once it purchased them. 9
The British government purchased the planes from the Canadian
company. After the war, the defendant purchased the planes from the

4 Donnelly, supra note 8, at 451.
Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1885).
51

Id

" Id at 185.
53

Id

Boesch, 133 U.S. at 697-709.
s Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71,72-73 (2d Cir. 1920).
17 Id at 72-73.
s' 1ld at 73.
s' 141 at 80.
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British government and imported them into the United States.' In its
decision denying the plaintiff an injunction, the court reasoned that a
purchaser of an authorized good containing a patent possesses an "absolute
property" in that article. 6'
If a patentee or his assignee sells a patented article, that
article is freed from the monopoly of any patents which the
vendor may possess. If the thing sold contains inventions of
several United States patents owned by the vendor, the
article is free from each and all of them; and if the vendor
has divided his monopoly into different territorial monopolies, his sale frees the article from them all. If the vendor's
patent monopoly consists of foreign and domestic patents,
the sale frees the article from the monopoly of both his
foreign and his domestic patents, and where there is no
restriction in the contract of sale the purchaser acquired the
complete title and full right to use and sell the article in any
and every country.62
While holding that the first doctrine applied globally, the court distinguished this case from a situation in which a patent owner sold a license to
another entity limiting the patented product's manufacture and distribution
to a specific country. 63 There, the owner grants a license to a third party to
manufacture and sell the good in a particular country. Consequently, the
owner's patent rights are not exhausted in countries where the third party
did not have a license to sell.'
Other courts have distinguished a patent owner granting an exclusive
license to a third party to practice a patent in a foreign country from the
patent owner herself selling her product in another country.6" In Griffin v.

60

Id at 74.

" Id at 78 (quoting Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed, 157 U.S. 659, 660 (1895)).
62 Id at 78.
63Id at 79.
Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d Cir. 1920).
65 Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428 (E.D. Pa.
1978); see also Donnelly, supra note 8, at 452 (stating that other courts concluded that "when parallel
patents are held in the United States and abroad, sales under the foreign patents will not exhaust U.S.
patent rights").
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Keystone Mushroom Farm,Inc., the District Court of Pennsylvania held that
the Boesch doctrine against exhaustion applied even when the overseas first
sale was authorized by the patent owner." In Griffin, the plaintiff held
parallel patents on farm equipment in Italy and the United States.67 He
licensed his Italian rights to a company he formed to produce the
equipment.6 8 The defendant purchased the equipment in Italy and imported
it to the United States.69 The defendant argued that allowing the plaintiff to
stop the importation of the equipment would amount to a windfall "double
recovery" since the plaintiff had already received a royalty for the equipment
from the Italian licensing agreement.7"
The court disagreed, stating that the underlying principles governing
patent law were to allow patent owners to exclude others from making,
using and selling the patented invention."1 One method of exclusion is to
grant licenses to only those entities that the owner wants to practice the
patent.7 2 Allowing the defendant to import the equipment sold under the
Italian license would thwart the patent owner's ability to exclude persons
from practicing the patent in America.73
The Griffin court also reiterated the principle expounded in Boesch,
stating that the "sale of articles in the United States under a United States
patent cannot be controlled by foreign laws." 4 Ruling for the defendant
would violate that principle by allowing rights confirmed under an Italian
patent to control the rights of an American patent holder.
In Sanofi v. Med-Tech VeterinarianProducts, Inc., the District Court of
New Jersey clarified under what circumstances parallel imports infringe and
who may bring an infringement action.7" There, a French pharmaceutical
company sold an exclusive license to American Home Products for its
United States patent on acepromazine maleate, a tranquilizer for the
treatment of animals .6 Sanofi continued to produce and market the drug

Griffin, 453 F. Supp. 1283.

' id

" Id. at 1284.
69 Id

' Id at 1285.
71

Id.

72 Id
71 Id

"' Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
7s Donnelly, supra note
8.
"' Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 416
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in Europe. The defendant purchased the drug in Europe and then imported
it to the United States. Both Sanofi and its exclusive licensee, American
Home Products, sued for patent infringement citing Boescb and Griffin.78
The court held that while American Home Products had a valid claim, its
licensor, Sanofi did not. 9 Discussing Sanofi's claim, the court distinguished
Boesch and Griffin on the ground that neither of the plaintiffs in those cases
had sold the product overseas."0 Sanofi sold the drug throughout Europe."
Consequently, the court analogized Sanofi's case toMattheson where the U.S.
patent holder sold the patentable articles overseas. 2 Like the court in
Mattheson, the District Court of New Jersey found that allowing Sanofi to
impose restrictions against the defendant's use would be inconsistent with
the defendant's expectation of full ownership. 3
Moreover, the plaintiffs in Boesch and Griffin had authority to sell their
product in the United States." Here, Sanofi granted an exclusive license to
American Home Products for all United States sales.8 Therefore, the court
determined that it could not enforce an injunction on behalf of Sanofi,
because Sanofi had no rights to sell the drug in the United States." On the
other hand, American Home had exclusive rights to practice the patent in
the United States. Thus, the defendant's lawful purchase of the drug from
Sanofi in Europe did not give the defendant the right to ship it to the U.S.
because Sanofi had no right to sell the drug in the U.S. A purchaser, though
acquiring the "whole right of the vendor in the thing sold,"88 still may only
do with that product what the vendor could have lawfully done and acquires
no right greater than that possessed by the owner.8 Thus, American Home's
infringement claim was valid.

(D.N.J. 1983).
n Id at 937.
n Id
79 Id

11Id at 937-38.
:2 Id.

Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 938 (D.N.J. 1983).
1at
d 939.

"

SId at 938.
36

'

Id at 939.
Id at 938 (quoting Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185 (C.C.N.Y. 1885)).
Id. at 939.
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The court also addressed the differences between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses.9 0 The court stated that a non-exclusive license confers
only the privilege to sell the patented product without infringing the
patent.9 1 Because the owner of a non-exclusive license could not prevent the
patent owner from granting other licenses, he could not bring a claim for
92
patent infringement.
On the other hand, an exclusive license conveys the promise that others
will be excluded from practicing the patent in the field of use for which the
patent was granted.93 Consequently, the owner of an exclusive license may
bring a claim against those who infringe upon it.94 But that right is restricted
to the field of use in which the exclusive license has been given; therefore,
the original patent owner does not have an actionable claim.9"
In sum, the courts have laid down the following rule: parallel imports are
not infringing when the one authorizedto practice the patent right domestically makes the first sale abroad. However, where the patent owner grants
an exclusive license to practice the patent in the United States, the exclusive
licensee's rights are not exhausted when another entity sells the product
abroad.
Assuming this correctly states the rule, 96 then even if L'azna is applied to
patents, it would not alter the current state of the law. In L'azna the seller
overseas was the entity authorized to practice the patent in the United
States. 97 Consequently, were the case to have arisen as a patent infringement
dispute, the Court probably would have allowed parallel imports of the
L'azna product based on existing patent law.

" ld at 936.

91Id
92 Id

" Id at 937.

"4id

s Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 937 (D.NJ. 1983).
At least two commentators on the topic believe courts disagree whether sales abroad exhaust

United States patent rights, and, if so, under what circumstances. See Donnelly, supra note 8, at 454; see
also Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 190 (stating that the TRIPS agreement created confusion
regarding the ultimate position of IPRs and competing non-pirated imports). However, under this
author's analysis, the cases seem to harmonize.
"7Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
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C. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETING ACT: A COMPLETE BAN ON PARALLEL
IMPORTS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS

In the case of prescription drugs, prior to the 2000 Amendments,
Congress had passed the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA)
completely banning parallel imports of pharmaceuticals. Passed due to
concerns for the health and safety of consumers," the PDMA prohibits the
re-importation of pharmaceuticals into the United States unless done by the
original manufacturer.99 For example, should a foreign licensee receive bulk
shipments of a drug from an American manufacturer, it would be prohibited
from importing that drug back into the United States."° This provision,
however, does not prohibit the general importation into the United States
of FDA approved drugs manufactured in foreign countries.1 t'
Despite this legislation, the FDA allows consumers to purchase prescription drugs in Mexico or Canada so long as the drugs purchased are for
personal use only. 2 The " 'personal use' exception authorizes persons to
return to this country with limited quantities of drugs-even drugs not
approved by the FDA-for their own use, so long as they pose no serious
health hazard.""0 3
D. PARALLEL IMPORTATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION

Parallel importation of pharmaceuticals is allowed among Member States
of the European Union."° Article 30 of the European Economic Community establishes the general rule prohibiting national laws that restrict the

" See Lars Noah, NAFTA's Impact on the Trade in Pbarmaceuticals,33 HOus. L. REV. 1293, 1308
(quoting statements in the Congressional record noting that "[t]he ready market for re-imports has...

been a catalyst for the perpetration of a continuing series of frauds against American manufacturers, and
has provided the cover for the importation of counterfeit pharmaceuticals in several cases." H.R. Rep.
No. 100-76, at 7 (1987)).

21 U.S.C. S 381(d)(1) (1994).

1 Noah, supra note 98, at 1308.
101 id

Id at 1312.
103See id at 1314 (citing Food & Drug Administration, Regulatory Procedures Manual S 9-71-30(C)

102

(Feb. 1, 1989)).

" See generallyReindi, supra note 7 (criticizing the ECJ's application of the EU's free movement rule).
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free flow of goods.' However, Article 36 provides an exception allowing
restrictions for intellectual property related goods provided that they are not
disguised restrictions on intra-EU trade.'" Nevertheless, the following case
law sets out the general rule that exclusive rights of intellectual property
holders are exhausted when an article is lawfully sold with the consent of the
IPR owner in any country within the EU.
In Centrafarm v. SterlingDrug Inc., the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (ECJ) first held that the marketing or sale of a patented
product in a Member State with the consent of the patent owner exhausted
national patent rights."°7 Stating that "a product lawfully [for] sale in the
Community must be able to circulate freely within it, . . . ,,,108 the court
established the "free movement" rule for goods first sold within the EU.' °
The ECJ extended Centrafarm with its holding in Merck v. Stephar."°
There, the court held that the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion
applied to those products that had been first marketed in Member States in
which patent protection was unavailable."' In Stephar,Merck owned patents
in the Netherlands on the drug Moduretic, a diuretic."' Merck also
marketed this drug in Italy, which at the time did not offer patent protection." 3 Stephar purchased the drug wholesale in Italy and sought to resell it
in the Netherlands." 4 Merck argued that since the purpose of patent
protection was to allow the patentee to benefit from the exclusive right to
first market the patented article, this right could not be exhausted when the

15 Article 30 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community provides, "Quantitative

restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall... be prohibited between Member
States." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,1957, part. 30,298
U.N.T.S. 11 (hereinafter EEC TREATY]. Donnelly, supra note 8, at 469.
106 Article 36 provides that Article 30 shall not "preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports,
exports, or goods in transit justified on the grounds of... the protection of industrial and commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States." EEC TREATY art. 36.
107 Case 15/74 Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147,[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974).
Id. at 1173.
Io at 1171.
Id.
10 Reindl, supra note 7, at 823.
. Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, [1981) 3 C.M.L.R. 463 (1981).
112 Id.
15 Id. At the time the drug was marketed in Italy, there was a decree that no patent protection would
be available. This decree was later held unconstitutional, but by that time the drug was no longer novel
and thus, not patentable. Id.
114

Id.
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first sale was in a state that did not afford such an exclusive right."1
Nevertheless, the court maintained that while a patent guaranteed the rights
to first market a product, a patent did not automatically guarantee that the
patentee would obtain a patent-like reward in all circumstances." 6 Instead,
the court focused on the patent holder's decision to market the product in
a state that did not afford patent protection. Since Merck consented to the
drug's sale in such a Member State, the court held that its patent protection
on that article was exhausted throughout the Community."'
The ECJ's reasoning in Stephar was challenged in Merck v. Primecrown."8
There, pharmaceutical products were first placed in Spain and Portugal at a
time when no product patents were available for pharmaceuticals in those
countries." 9 Analogous to Stephar, these products were purchased wholesale
in Spain and Portugal and imported into Great Britain. 2 ' Despite the
Advocate General's opinion to overrule Stephar,"' the ECJ affirmed, again
noting the consent of the patentee to market the product in Portugal and
Spain:
The substance of a patent right lies essentially in according
the inventor an exclusive right to put the product on the
market for the first time. It is for the holder of the patent to
decide, in the light of all the circumstances, under what
conditions he will market his product, and to decide
whether or not to market it in a Member State in which
there is no protection under the law for the product in
question. 122
Moreover, the ECJ in Primecrown also concluded that the "free movement"
rule applied despite imposition of price controls in a Member State. 2 '

115

l

116 Id
117 Id

"' Joined Cases 267 & 268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R 1-6285, [1997] 1

C.M.L.R. 83 (1996).
119 Id

120 Id

"' SeeDonnely, supra note 8, at 477 (citing Primecrown, 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, opinion of the Advocate
General at 201).
12 Primecrown, 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285 at 1-6287.
123

Id
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Despite the ECJ's adherence to the "free movement" rule in Stepbar and
Primecrown, the court did not apply the exhaustion principle when a
patented product is sold in a Member State without the consent of the
patentee.124 For instance, in Pharmon v. Hoechst, the ECJ held that sales
under a compulsory license did not exhaust patent rights, because the
patentee did not freely consent to market the product in a Member State that
grants a compulsory license. 2 '
While the European Union allows parallel importation within the
Community, the ECJ restricts parallel importation of goods first sold outside
the EU.'2' In a recent trademark case, the ECJ found that the European
Commission directive on trademarks mandated only an intra-community
exhaustion rule.'
Member States are required to uphold the rights of
trademark owners to restrict parallel imports from outside the EU.'28 It is
widely assumed this case would apply to patents as well. 1 9
In sum, within the European Community, patent rights are exhausted

upon the first sale of the patented item with the consent of the patent holder.
However, first sales outside the Community do not exhaust patent rights
within the European Union.
IV. PARALLEL TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE UNITED STATES
UNDER THE 2000 AMENDMENTS

Were the 2000 amendments to take effect, 30 the United States would be
adopting a rule similar to that which currently exists within the European
Union. So long as the drug complied with other FDA regulations, any
patented United States drug sold overseas by the U.S. patent holder or its
authorized licensee could then be imported back to the United States.
Whereas, under current U.S. patent law a patent holder could prevent

124 Donnelly, supra note 8, at 476.

125Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 775 (1985).

.26
See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 199 (stating that "the ECJ indicated that parallel
imports from nations outside the EU would be treated differently and the territorial nature of IPRs would
hold sway").
1v Id

Id
Id.
1"0See infra note 4 (discussing that the FDA would require significant appropriations to effectively
128

129

administer the new law and that the law would not take effect until those appropriations were made).
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parallel imports contractually by establishing an exclusive U.S. licensee,'
the proposed legislation would allow parallel imports even in situations
where there was an exclusive U.S. licensee. Consequently, entities with an
exclusive domestic license for a pharmaceutical drug would be unable to
prevent the parallel importation of that drug even when another entity was
the one who sold it overseas.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF PARALLEL IMPORTS ON THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
A. STRUCTURE OF PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

1. Dependence on a Strong Patent Regime. Drug innovation is an
expensive, lengthy process in which pharmaceutical companies face a
significant amount of financial risk.'32 Since 1990, research based pharmaceutical companies have more than doubled their research and development
expenditures. In 1999 alone, 20% of gross sales was poured back into to
research and development of new pharmaceutical products.13 3 According to
Gerald Mossinghoff, President of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, it takes an average of $359 million and about ten
to twelve years to bring one new pharmaceutical to the market.3 4
In addition to the costs and length of time it takes to bring a new drug to
market, drug innovation is also a very uncertain. Recent studies show that
only about one in 5000 compounds synthesized in pharmaceutical laboratories ever reaches the market.13 Of these drugs only three in ten cover costs
taxes. 13 6 Consequently, 20% of the
of development after the deduction of
137
profits.
the
of
products generate 70%

...
See Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J. 1983) (allowing
suit when one has exclusive U.S. license to sell patented product).
12 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 208.
13. See id. at 208 (citing Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing Association (PhRMA),
Pharmaceutical Industry Profile: 1999 59, ch. 2 (1999)).
"3James M. Silberman, The NorthAmerican Free TradeAgreement'sEffect on PbarmaceuticalPatents:
A Bitter Pillto Swallow ora TherapeuticSolution?, 12 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. &POL'Y 607,607 (1996).
135 See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 209 (citing R.S. Halliday et al., R&D Philosophyand
Management in the World's Leading PbarmaceuticalCompanies, 1992 J. PHARMACEUTICAL MED. 139

(1992)).
136
117

See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 209.
Id4
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The benefits that makes the risks and costs of innovation worthwhile are
the exclusive rights afforded by patent protection once a new drug has been
developed.'
Absent patent protection, third parties could "free ride"' 39 on
the intellectual capital developed by the innovating company producing the
same drug without the large research and development expenditures."
The exclusive right to market a drug afforded by patent protection allows
pharmaceuticals to charge supra-competitive prices. Supra-competitive prices
enable pharmaceuticals to recoup the cost of their investment on that drug
and recover losses incurred from the development of countless other drugs
which were not marketable. 14"' Therefore, without strong patent protection,
pharmaceutical companies would have little incentive to develop new drugs.
Due to the high cost of research and development and small number of
compounds that actually pay off, patent protection is the lifeblood of drug
companies enabling them to continue innovating new drugs.'42 A recent
survey asked R&D executives of 100 U.S. firms what portion of inventions
they developed in the past three years would not have been developed
without patents. The pharmaceutical industry's response reveals its strong
dependence on the patent regime." 3 Pharmaceutical executives claimed that
60% of their drugs would not have been developed without patents versus
only 17% for the machinery industry and 11% for electrical equipment.'"
Furthermore, the study found that pharmaceutical companies had sought
patent protection for 80% of their patentable drugs as compared to only 50%
among other industries. 4
2. The PharmaceuticalDistributionSystem. In order to capitalize on the
benefits that patent protection affords, pharmaceutical companies must
maintain an effective distribution system." 6 The price for a particular
pharmaceutical may vary considerably between countries due to a myriad of

.. Thomas G. Field, Pharmaceuticalsand IntellectualProperty:Meeting Needs Throughout the World,
31 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 3, 14 (1990).
9 "Free ride" means to extract the benefits of something without paying for its costs.
'4 See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 186 (stating that costless imitation of new products
would produce too little innovation but for the patent system).
14
Field, supra note 138, at 19.
142 Silberman, supra note 134, at 608.
'
Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 214-15.
'4
Id. (citing a study by Edwin Mansfield entitled PatentsandInnovation:An EmpiricalStudy, MGMT.
SCI., Feb. 1986, at 175).
14s Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 215.
"6 Id. at 222.
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factors: differences in consumer demand, the exchange rate, differing
property regimes, as well as differing regulatory regimes concerning
pharmaceuticals. 14 7 Due to international price differentials, pharmaceutical
producers often sign contracts with distributors authorizing them to market
their drug only within a defined region.148 Such contracts are known as
geographic territorial restraints. So long as there is a ban on parallel imports,
geographic restraints allow pharmaceuticals to charge different prices to
consumers based on their geographic location. 49 In other words,
pharmaceutical companies segment the world market into discrete geographic regions adjusting price accordingly to maximize their recovery of
capital.'
Territorial price discrimination is entirely consistent with
underlying patent rationale.' 1 By allowing the patentee to capture a larger
part of the potential value attached to his invention, it increases a patentee's
incentive to develop new products.' Moreover, territorial price discrimination allows a patentee to capitalize on distributional efficiencies, thereby
offering pharmaceuticals to more regions of the globe. 3
B. EFFECTS OF PARALLEL IMPORTS ON THE PRICE OF PHARMACEUTICALS

Perhaps the biggest argument in support of the 2000 amendments is that
allowing the parallel importation of drugs would reduce prices to United
States consumers, particularly senior-citizens who spend a significant
proportion of their income on pharmaceuticals. 4 While the immediate
effect of allowing the parallel importation of drugs would be to reduce the
price within the United States, the long-term effect on the pricing of
pharmaceuticals worldwide would be a move toward a single uniform price.
When prices across national markets differ widely, and parallel imports
are allowed, a producer has three choices: (1) maintain price differentials, (2)

ld. at 245-46.
1d However, such exclusive contracts in regions are due in large measure to governmental
regulations in many nations. Many countries have a monopsonistic system, whereby one usually statecontrolled entity purchases and distributes the pharmaceutical product.
149Id
"so Id.
"i

'Id

.. Id at 223.
1s2

Id

"I Id at 250-51.

154 See Carey, supra note 4, at 130 (relating a story of a senior citizen forced to either
skip doses of
heart medication or cut back on other necessities).
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set a higher uniform price worldwide, or (3) market the drug exclusively in
high price nations."15 Should a producer choose the first option, a parallel
trader will purchase massive quantities of the good in low price countries and
re-import them into higher priced markets, thus undercutting the price
there."5 6 While prices will fall in the high price markets, prices will rise in
low price markets due to increased demand for the product as a result of the
entry of a new consumer, the parallel trader. Consequently, a uniform price
emerges."' 7 The second option results in the same effect, just bypassing the
parallel trader."5 Under the third option, not only do prices among wealthy
nations converge, but consumers in less developed nations are unable to
acquire much needed medicines." 9
C. CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFORM PRICING IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

Absent price controls, higher prices for pharmaceuticals in developing
nations would be the necessary result of a new law allowing the parallel
importation of pharmaceuticals. Consequently, this law could have tragic
results for developing nations who no longer would be able to afford
innovative therapies."6
So long as a drug company can make up for reduced profits from sales in
poorer nations with higher profits in richer countries, it can offer its drug at
prices consumers in less developed countries can afford to pay. 6 ' For
example, in the case of drugs treating HIV/AIIDS, pharmaceutical companies
have been able to reduce the price by 50 to 75% of the medicines destined for
153 Donnelly, supra note 8, at 503. This scenario assumes the absence of government controls over
prices which will be taken into account later in the analysis.
Is' Id
157 Id

19 The ECq foreshadows such a result in its two Merck opinions discussed infra Part I.D. In them,
the ECJ states that the patent holder has the power to decide "under what conditions he will market his
product." Joined Cases 267 & 268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 83 (1996). Thus, the ECJ insinuates that should apatent holder not like the market conditions

of a certain nation, she should refuse to sell her medicines there. Nevertheless, were pharmaceutical
companies to refuse to sell to poorer nations, the worldwide community would most likely clamor for
compulsory licensing. Since compulsory licensing is beyond the scope of this Note, the possibility and
ramifications of companies refusing to market medicines to poorer nations is not fully addressed.
"se See Richard P. Rozek & Ruth Berkowitz, The Effects of Patent Protection on the Prices of
PharmaceuticalProducts-Is
IntellectualPropertyProtectionRaisingtheDrugBill in DevelopingCountries?,
1 J.WORLD INTELL. PROP. 179, 215-16 (1998).
161Id/
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developing countries.162 Allowing parallel trade reduces any incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to make concessions to these nations.163
If concessions were made to poorer countries, consumers worldwide
would be hurt as declines in research and development would bring fewer
products to market."6 Since parallel importation of pharmaceuticals would
reduce their profits, pharmaceutical companies would have both less money
to devote to research and development and less incentive to innovate.'65
D. ATTACKING THE FREE TRADE ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ALLOWING
PARALLEL IMPORTS OF PHARMACEUTICALS

Proponents of the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals, and that of
international exhaustion in general, disapprove of pharmaceutical companies'
ability to price discriminate. They maintain that policies allowing parallel
imports are in line with free trade principles established by the WTO.'"
According to Professor Abbott of the International Trade Law Committee
(ITLC), "restrictions on the free movement of goods and services legitimately
placed on the world market are inconsistent with the underlying objective
6
of the GATT-WTO system...," the liberalization of markets. 1
This free trade argument when applied to the pharmaceutical industry is
flawed for two reasons: (1) Different nations have different patent regimes,
and (2) Government regulations on pharmaceuticals often include price
controls artificially reducing the price of drugs. Consequently, price
differentials are not the result of market forces. Thus, free trade via parallel
imports is not truly free in the traditional "laissez-faire" sense and would not

" Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 251 (citing Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflict Between
ParallelTrade and Product Access and Innozation: The Case of Pbarnaceuticals,1998 J. INT'L ECON. L.
638).
16 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 251. However, research has shown that pharmaceutical
companies do take into account ethical considerations when deciding whether to supply needed drugs to
low price nations: "To deny the sick medicines is not the way they act." Id. (quoting M.L. Burstall &
L.S.T. Services, Undermining Innovation: Parallel Trade in Prescription Medicines 24, 66 (1992)).
164 Id at 250.
165

Id

166

Id at 191 (citing Frederick M. Abbott, Discussion Paper for Conference on Exhaustion of

Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Importation in World Trade 3 (Draft Paper for Conference on
Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Importation in World Trade, Geneva Switzerland)
(Nov. 6-7, 1998)).
167 See id (supporting international exhaustion based on free trade principles, but making no reference
to any specific U.S. legislation allowing the parallel importation of drugs).
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improve world-wide welfare.168 To the contrary, allowing parallel imports
could have drastic consequences on worldwide welfare. 69
1. Different Patent Regimes Across Nations. Allowing parallel imports
from countries with different patent regimes has the effect of importing
those regimes and controls on the U.S., thereby allowing foreign laws to
control U.S. patent rights in violation of longstanding U.S. policy.'
As
demonstrated in the discussion concerning patent protection of
pharmaceuticals within the EU, patent regimes may differ from country to
country.' Consequently, patents that are current in the United States may
not be current in all countries worldwide.1' Like certain states within the
EU, some countries may not even offer protection at all." 3 A law allowing
parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in the U.S. would create a situation not
unlike that which currently exists within the EU. However, the consequences would be much greater because parallel imports could come in from
any country in the world.
In a country where a patented drug was not protected, either because it
was no longer current, or the country did not offer patent protection,
generic drugs of the same composition as the patented one would be allowed.
Generic competition would then bring down prices for the patented drug in
such countries. Parallel importation of the patented drug would cause prices
to fall domestically since the drug was purchased in a nation that allowed
generic competition. ' Consequently, the rights and benefits afforded under
United States patent protection would be circumvented by foreign law.
A rule of exhaustion among nations with different patent regimes
effectively exports the laws of the nation with the least protection to all

1,1 See id. at 193 (quoting economist Carsten Fink: "[T]he conditions surrounding parallel trade do

not fit into the assumptions on which standard static (short-term effects) trade models supporting the case
for laissez-faire trade are built." Carsten Fink, Does NationalExhaustionoflntellectualPropertyContradict
thePrincipleofFree Trade?(Draft Paper for Conference on Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and
Parallel Importation in World Trade, Geneva, Switzerland) (Nov. 6-7, 1998)).
169 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 251.
See Boesch v. Griff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890) (stating that the sale of goods of products containing U.S.
patents could not be controlled by foreign law).
17, See discussion infra Part EIlc. (comparing effects of policies either affording or refusing to afford
patent protection).
"7 The Trips agreement discussed infra Part lI.A provides only a minimum of standards for
intellectual property rights. It does not harmonize them completely across nations.
' Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 246.
114 See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 245-46 (discussing results of allowing parallel trade
of pharmaceuticals in a general context).
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other nations. As mentioned above, the European Union currently has a
rule of exhaustion intra-community. 75 In Merck v. Primecrown, the
Advocate General criticized the logic of such a rule for patented drugs sold
in Member States that did not afford patent protection precisely for this
reason. 176 According to the Advocate General, the free movement of goods
among such states has the effect of exporting one Member State's patent
regime into all the nations of the European Union." n Therefore, the
practical result is a Community-wide regime when such a regime does not
exist."'8
Applying the logic of the Advocate General, a law allowing parallel
imports of pharmaceuticals would have the effect of exporting the patent
laws pertaining to pharmaceutical products of other nations into the United
States.17 9 This would violate a fundamental principle of our patent regime
by allowing foreign laws to control the sale of products in the United States
under a United States patent. A pharmaceutical company that sells its drug
in countries that do not afford patent protection must reduce its price to
compete with generics. Allowing parallel imports from such a nation would
reduce the price of the patented drug in the U.S. due to competition from
the parallel import. Consequently, the resulting U.S. price would move
toward that of the price of the drug in nations where no patent protection
was afforded. Thus, the prices of patented drugs in the U.S. would
effectively be dictated by foreign laws.
2. Price Controls on Pharmaceuticals. Applying the same argument,
allowing parallel imports of pharmaceuticals would also have the effect of
importing other countries' price controls into the United States. 8 ' Price
differentials are largely the result of price controls that numerous countries
place on patented drugs.18' Were exhaustion in the U.S. to occur after the
first sale in nations with price controls, the uniform price worldwide would

"7

See discussion on EU law infra Part Ill.C (illustrating exhaustion within the EU).

176 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Joined Cases 267-268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown

Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, (1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83, 130 (1996).
177 Id.
179 Id

ISOSee Reindl, supra note 7, at 833 (extending Advocate General Fennelly's argument to apply when
Member States set different price controls on pharmaceuticals).
...Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 246.
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move toward that which exists in countries with the lowest government
regulated price.
Furthermore, allowing parallel imports from countries that place price
controls on pharmaceuticals would have serious negative implications for
pharmaceutical companies and consumers worldwide. Due to the huge costs
associated with research and development,'8 2 the pharmaceutical industry
faces considerable fixed costs'-costs that do not vary no matter how many
drugs are produced or how many consumers or countries utilize a drug.
However, marginal costs-the cost of producing additional pills of the same
drug-are relatively small.'84 Governments enacting price controls force the
price of pharmaceuticals down to their marginal costs. 8 ' Pharmaceutical
companies are willing to continue to supply drugs to these nations since the
mandated price control covers the cost of producing the additional drugs.' 8'
Nevertheless, basic economics dictates that in order to survive in the long
run, firms must be able to cover total costs-marginal and fixed in all
markets. 8 ' Pharmaceutical companies are able to cover the cost of research
and development by charging higher than marginal costs for drugs in freemarket countries like the United States. 88 In essence, governments enacting
price controls are free-riding on consumers in the United States and other
free market countries who pay the tremendous fixed costs associated with
research and development.189
3. Economic Implications of the 2000 Amendments. A law allowing
parallel importation from countries with price controls would prohibit a
pharmaceutical from ever recouping fixed cost, because U.S. prices would be
roughly equal to those in countries where price controls existed."" Absent
price controls, prices would become uniform, somewhere between the price

1

See discussion of the pharmaceutical industry, infra Part V.A..1.

15

il at 293.
See id2 (citing Patricia M. Danzon, The Economics of ParallelTrade, 13 PHARMAECONOMICS 301

(Mar. 1998). Danzon estimates short-term marginal costs in the pharmaceutical industry to be only 30%
of total costs).
131 Id,
'8 Id.
I' As discussed infra Part V.A. 1,the underlying rationale for a patent regime is to allow patent owners
to price above marginal costs in order to recoup their large innovative costs.
its See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 249 (discussing Ramsey pricing theory of charging
different prices to different consumers based on their relative demand elasticity).
13 Id. at 248 (citing Danzon article, supra note 184).
1 See ia (citing Danzon article, supranote 183, stating that if all users paid only marginal cost of drug
production, revenue shortfall to pharmaceuticals could be as high as 70%).
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existing in poor and rich nations. 9 ' Here, however, price controls would
prevent the price from increasing despite an increase in demand. Therefore,
drug prices in nations with price controls would remain at their artificially
low levels, and prices in the U.S. would move toward these low prices.""
Consequently, prices would only remain greater than marginal cost, but
never high enough for pharmaceutical firms to recoup their fixed innovative
costs.

193

Since firms unable to recoup fixed costs cannot remain in business, there
is a general consensus that it is sensible trade policy to exclude parallel
imports that are subject to price controls. 194 Even those who support
international exhaustion in general make an exception when price differentials are the result of government regulation. 9 For example, in his article
supporting parallel trade, Frederick Abbot states:
One can envisage an exception to an open international
parallel importation rule based upon government price
controls directed at a specific industry, for example, the
pharmaceutical industry. By setting a non-market price, the
government subsidizes exports at the expense of the manufacturer.9
As these comments indicate, even those who support international
exhaustion based on free-trade principals recognize the negative consequences such a rule would have when price differentials are the result of
governmental controls.

. See discussion infra Part V.B (citing Donnelly, supra note 8, at 503).
9 Donnelly, supra note 8, at 503.
1
See id (stating that global nature of the pharmaceutical industry combined with the high ratio of
sunk research and development costs render the industry particularly vulnerable to the effects of parallel
trade).
'" Hillary A. Kremen, Caveat Venditor: InternationalApplication of the First Sale Doctrine, 23
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 161, 162 (Spring 1997).
M'See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 246-47 (citing Frederick M. Abbott, First Report
(Final)to the Committee on InternationalTradeLaw ofthe InternationalLaw Association on the Subject of
ParallelImportation, 1J. INT'L ECON. L. 607, 623 (1998)).
19 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 26, at 247 n.192 (quoting Abbott, supra note 195).
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E. LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE 2000 AMENDMENTS-WOULD POORER
NATIONS BAN PARALLEL EXPORTS?

Firms who cannot recoup fixed costs cannot remain in business in the
long run. Therefore, pharmaceutical companies could be forced to abstain
from selling drugs in nations whose price controls only allow them to cover
their marginal costs. This move would force these governments to either (1)
lift price controls or (2) ban the exportation of pharmaceuticals. Since
nations with price controls tend to be poorer nations whose citizenry would
not be able to afford patented drugs otherwise, governments would probably
not choose the first option. Ironically, the long run consequence of allowing
parallel imports into the U.S. could be laws in poorer nations banning
parallel exports.197
Another reason why poorer nations might ban the export of
pharmaceuticals is that demand for pharmaceuticals would outstrip supply.
Were parallel importation allowed, there would be a vast increase in demand
as distributors would compete with consumers for the purchase of drugs."'
Moreover, those realizing benefits of price controls would be unauthorized
parallel importers and consumers in wealthy nations, not sick people in price
control countries.'" As a result, there would be strong incentives for
governments of poorer nations to effectively ban the export of
pharmaceuticals." °
VI. CONCLUSION

While a law allowing for the parallel importation of drugs may bring
benefits to U.S. consumers in the short term, in the long run, it could have
severe negative consequences for consumers in poorer nations, the pharmaceutical industry, and U.S. consumers.
Due to significant research and development costs and because the
information resulting from this research and development is a pure public

197 Even if a price control nation did not place an outright ban on pharmaceutical exports, it would

most likely enact a tariff high enough to elininate any profits a parallel trader could recoup.
198 See Kremen, supra note 194, at 163 (stating that the threat of unauthorized importers taking
advantage of price breaks offered to developing countries has a negative impact on international trade as
nations will be encouraged to seek remedies such as quotas and tariffs).
1" Id

200Id
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good once it is acquired, pharmaceutical companies must have strong patent
protection to remain viable. Only through this patent protection are
pharmaceuticals able to charge prices significantly above marginal price in
order to recoup the enormous fixed costs associated with research and
development expenditures.
Allowing parallel imports of drugs thwarts the protection provided by
U.S. patents. Though proponents argue that the 2000 amendments are in
line with free trade principals, price differentials of pharmaceuticals are
mostly the result of governmental intervention, not market forces.
Consequently, not only are the patented drugs imported into the U.S., but
the laws and regulations of the nations from which they come are imported
as well. The result is that U.S. patent protection is effectively reduced to that
offered in the nation with the least protection and the greatest price controls.
This result runs contrary to well established patent principals since the late
1800's and makes it virtually impossible for pharmaceutical companies to
recoup their fixed costs.
Faced with the possibility of insolvency, pharmaceuticals may stop
supplying drugs to poorer nations, harming consumers who most desperately
need innovative medicine. Should pharmaceuticals choose to continue to
supply poorer countries, U.S. consumers and consumers worldwide would
be harmed, because pharmaceutical companies would have few dollars and
little incentive to embark upon research that would lead to improved
medicine.

A. BRYAN BAER
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